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Testimony of Tim Wu 
Professor, Columbia Law School 
 
House Committee on the Judiciary 
Telecom & Antitrust Task Force 
 
Hearing on  
“Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory 
Access.” 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, 
 
 Over the last several months, the debate over Network Neutrality has 
provoked rather more of a reaction than I think anyone might have thought, 
and I want to begin by considering why. 
 
 I think there are several reasons.  First and foremost, this is an issue 
that affects people directly.  Once upon a time the internet was a kind of toy, 
used by hobbyists, scientists, and geeks.  But today it’s something different: it 
has become part of America’s basic infrastructure.  It has become as essential 
to people and to the economy as the roads, the electric grid, or the telephone.   
It's an infrastructure that people and firms depend on for everyday activities, 
whether planning weddings, managing investments, or running a small 
business.    
  
 Given this infrastructure, Americans are accustomed to basic rights to 
use the network as they see fit.  That’s why there’s been surprise and 
indignation over plans, advanced by the Bells, to begin deciding what 
consumers want, by slowing down disfavored companies, and speeding up 
favored companies.  It’s as if the electric company one day announced that 
refrigerators made by General Electric would henceforth not work quite as 
well as those made by Samsung.  That would be a shock, because when it 
comes to the electric grid and the internet, people are used to a network that 
they are free to use as they wish. 
  
 Second, whatever AT&T and others may claim as motives, the 
potential for abuse of market power is obvious to everyone.  Ninety-four 
percent of Americans have either zero, one, or two choices for broadband 
access.1  Many of us wish things were otherwise, but they are not.  
                                            
1 Cf. Federal Communications Commissions, “High-Speed Services for Internet Access,” 
as of 12/31/04, available at <http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html>. 
Tim Wu, Testimony, Network Neutrality 
 2
 
Given today’s market, it’s obvious that a firm like AT&T may earn, at the 
margin, more money by distorting competition among internet firms.  It can, 
through implicit threats of degradation, extract a kind of protection money 
for those with the resources to pay up.  It’s basically the Tony Soprano model 
of networking, and while it makes some sense for whoever is in a position to 
make threats, it isn’t particularly good for the nation’s economy, innovation, 
or consumer welfare. 
 
* * * 
 
 The problem faced here is actually not new at all—it is a familiar 
problem of market power on networks that government has grappled with 
since the days of the telegraph.  What I want to make clear is the central 
economic tradeoff involved in these kinds of cases.  Letting the internet or 
any infrastructure become discriminatory may offer marginally more profit 
for operators.  But it does so at the cost of a tax on network competition and 
innovation.   Whether it’s a nation’s ports, roads, canals, or information 
networks, discrimination comes at a price to the activities that depend on the 
infrastructure. 
 
 That’s why at nearly every stage in the history, governments have 
maintained at least a basic anti-discrimination rule to block the worst forms 
of anti-competitive behavior.  And today, that’s all that’s needed – a simple 
ban on the worst kinds of behavior; a basic rule whose goal is simply to 
guarantee basic consumer rights and let the free market work. 
 
Network Discrimination Problems in History and Today 
 
Problems of network discrimination are nothing new.   Network owners with 
market power have always been tempted to use their gatekeeper position to 
discriminate between favored and disfavored uses. 
 
The history, in fact, goes as far back as the 1860s, when Western Union, the 
telegraph monopolist, signed an exclusive deal with the Associated Press.   
Other wire services were priced-off the network – not blocked, but 
discriminated against.2  The result was to build Associated Press into a news 
monopoly that was not just dangerous for business, but dangerous for 
American democracy. As telecommunications historian Paul Starr writes 
“Western Union had exclusive contracts with the railroads; AP had exclusive 
                                            
2 For more on the early history of the telegraph, see Robert L. Thompson, Wiring a 
Continent:  The History of the Telegraph in the United States 1832-1866 (1947); Daniel J 
Czitrom, Media and the American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan, ch. 1 (1982); Paul Starr, 
the Creation of the Media 184 (2005).  
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contracts with Western Union; and individual newspapers had exclusive 
contracts with AP.  These linkages made it difficult for rival news services to 
break in.”3   The AP monopoly had an agenda:  it didn’t just favor Google or 
Yahoo – it went as far as to chose politicians it liked and those it didn’t.   As 
Historian Menahem Blondheim has documented, AP used its Western Union-
backed monopoly to influence politics in the late 19th century, even going so 
far as to exercise censorship on behalf of the State.   The method was simple: 
when faced with messages from disfavored politicians, the wires simply didn’t 
carry them.   
 
A much more recent example comes from the 1960s, when the Bells would 
not allow anyone to hook up anything to their telephone system other than a 
Bell telephone.4   It took the courage of the D.C. Circuit, and later the FCC, to 
force Bell to accept a consumer’s right to attach anything to the network not 
dangerous to the network.  To that courage we owe better choice in 
telephones, and over  time much more.  To the freedom of network 
attachments we also owe the answering machine, the fax machine, and 
finally the modem and the whole birth of personal networking.  I don’t want 
to overstate the point, but freeing network attachments from Bell control, as 
technical as that sounds, has played a part in making this country the leader 
of the world in information technology.   Here’s what two FCC economists, 
Jay Atkinson & Christopher Barnekov, said about freeing network 
attachments from Bell control: 
 
 “we believe that the recent development of the Internet, and of much of 
 Information Technology, would not have happened if CPE (for 
 example, modems) were still marketed only by LECs.  The blossoming 
 of the CPE market into a highly competitive industry offering a wide 
 variety of choice at low cost and rapid technological advances, and 
 enabling previously unknown possibilities such as the increasingly 
 numerous Internet services, is arguably a direct consequence of the 
 deregulation of CPE.”5 
 
So what do we have today?   In terms of market structure, you have a range 
of diverse and highly competitive markets operating on top of the internet’s 
basic infrastructure.   These markets are viciously competitive.   Invent a 
new search engine, like Google did, and in a few years you can be a multi-
                                            
3 Starr, the Creation of the Media, 184. 
4 On this episode, see Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968); See Jay Atkinson & 
Christopher Barnekov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to Network Interconnection 3 
(Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 34, Dec. 2000); Kevin Werbach, Breaking 
the ICE, 4 J. Telecom & High Tech. L.J. (2005). 
5 See Jay Atkinson & Christopher Barnekov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to 
Network Interconnection 3 (Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 34, Dec. 2000). 
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billion dollar concern.  Write a popular blog, and if you’re lucky you can have 
nearly as many readers as the New York Times.   Conversely, many more 
businesses and ideas have failed, like the famed “pets.com,” but usually on 
the merits. 
 
 These markets functioning on top of the internet are in many ways an 
economist’s dream.   Barriers to entry are low.  Startup costs are minimal:  
many successful business began with just an idea and a good web site.  
Competition is mostly meritocratic – the best online stores win, not the ones 
with a famous names or the right connections.   Meritocratic competition, in 
turn, leads to Darwinian or what economists call “Schumpeterian” 
innovation.  That just means that new technologies supplant the old, in a 
constant process of industrial rebirth.  In all, today’s markets operating on 
top of the internet’s neutral infrastructure may be some of the best examples 
of markets working like the free markets are supposed to. 
 
But this thriving market has an Achilles heel.  For there’s one part of the net 
which isn’t competitive at all:  broadband access.  The access networks are 
part of the old telecom world – monopolistic, slow-moving, well-connected in 
Washington, and prone to anti-competitive behavior.   They are the 
“Broadband Bottleneck.”  And the Bells, who lead the way in their efforts to 
change the internet, are almost an extension of government, fed and raised 
on government subsidies and rate-setting since 1913 or so.   It is no surprise 
that they should be leading the way, looking for a way to make the free 
market of the internet work more and more like the old Bell monopoly. 
 
The Tradeoff  
 
In any discussion of neutrality rules, the Bells and even the cable companies 
will always turn back to their one big argument:  we need more money to 
build the infrastructure, and if you don’t give it to us, we won’t build it.  I 
think the government needs to learn how to stand up to these kinds of 
threats.   What we have here in truth is a tradeoff.   The Bells want 
permission to discriminate in exchange for a promise that they’ll use any 
money earned to build more infrastructure.  But even if the Bells make more 
money, and even if that money is actually invested in infrastructure 
deployments, that doesn’t mean the tradeoff costs don’t exist.  The tradeoff is 
a distortion, a tax, on the healthy markets that are on top of the basic 
network.    
 
It is inevitable that a discriminatory infrastructure will affect competition 
and innovation in the markets that depend on it.  Imagine, for a moment, 
that private American highway companies reserved a lane for Ford cars.  
That would be good for Ford, but obviously would affect competition as 
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between Ford and General Motors.   It would also slow innovation—for it 
would no longer be the best car than wins, but the one that signs the best 
deals and slows down their competitors.   The race is no longer to build a 
better car, but to fight for a better deal with the highway company. 
 
That’s the threat to innovation on the internet.  Today, as I said early, you 
can start a business on the internet with relatively little capital.  But in a 
world where AT&T or Verizon decides who gets priority access, 
entrepreneurs get a different message.  Its not who has a better product:  its 
who can make a deal with AT&T, Verizon, Comcast or Time-Warner.   That’s 
a different kind of market, one more like the old days of telecommunications.  
That’s when starting a network business meant making a deal with a big 
Telco, or forget it. 
 
In short, the long-term costs to the economy of allowing a discriminatory 
internet are real.  Encouraging infrastructure investments is a serious 
challenge, but in the end one only tangentially related to the Network 
Neutrality debate.  The real spur to network deployment and innovation will 
be market entry—whether municipal broadband, or otherwise, that scares 
today’s providers into offering something better.  Indeed, even given the 
limited competition we have today, it is the superiority of the cable network 
that has goaded the Bells into beginning fiber optic deployments.  For these 
deployment decisions, facilities-based competition is the strongest answer, 
and letting gatekeepers tax application competition is really a sideshow.   
Taxing innovation is hardly the only, and probably the most expensive way to 
encourage infrastructure deployment. 
 
On the Case for Maintaining Government’s Role 
 
I think many people agree instinctively that an open and neutral internet has 
been a good thing for the nation.  It’s been good for consumers, good for 
entrepreneurs, and good for the U.S. economy.   Countries become rich 
through innovation, and need basic infrastructure to innovate.   That’s often 
the difference between rich nations and poor – access to basic infrastructures 
needed to start a business.  In this respect the neutral internet has been a 
sterling example of an infrastructure that has driven the national economy.  
Perhaps, in U.S. history, only the early canals, railways, roads, railways and 
electric networks can compare as boosters to the U.S. economy and the well-
being of citizens. 
 
Even if neutrality works better – something the cable operators, to their 
credit, agree with – there is a different kind of hesitation out there.  It is as to 
whether government should be involved at all.  After all, Congress has with 
some exceptions stayed away from trying to regulate the Net, and for the 
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most part that’s been a good thing.  There’s no rate-setting, and no long 
battles over “internet unbundling.”  
 
But in truth things are more complex.   As everyone knows, the essential 
initial research and build-out of the internet was funded by the Defense 
Department.  That funding of research and development was an astonishing 
success, in part because the resulting design was so good it hasn’t much 
needed government.  The internet is by design diverse and decentralized, 
making competition on top of the infrastructure viciously competitive.  That 
competition has ironed out many of the problems government might 
otherwise be needed to solve. 
 
But while Government hasn’t acted much to regulate applications, at the 
infrastructure side the story is completely different.   The initial build-outs, 
as we already said, were all government funded.  Thereafter, through the 
entire history of the internet, the Government has maintained some kind of 
rules to maintain basic neutrality on the network—to control, in effect, the 
bottleneck it helped create.  We already discussed the deregulation of 
network attachment in the 1960s – a matter essential for letting consumers 
buy modems and hook them up, and a right that helped lead to a mass 
consumer internet.  Later, the Federal Communications Commission, 
through the 1980s and 1990s maintained rules that protected the rights of 
dialup ISPs to reach customers over the phone lines.  That tradition 
continued when, in the early 2000s, Chairman Michael Powell announced the 
“network freedoms” rules.   In 2005 the FCC fined a regional phone company 
that was blocking Voice over Internet services, the latest of a long tradition of 
efforts to protect Network Neutrality.6 
 
What do these stories have in common?   At each stage, the internet’s 
vigorous competition has relied on one baseline government guarantee:  
consumers get the use their network as they like.  That’s the same 
deregulatory instinct that government needs now – to guarantee consumers 
access to whatever content and applications they want, free of discrimination 
and playing favorites. 
 
Some of you may feel hesitant, feel that government’s role will necessarily be 
complex.   It need not be.  All government needs to say is this:  leave things 
the way they are.   It needs merely to recognize consumers’ rights to access 
the content and applications of their choice, free from discrimination, and 
give meaningful remedies when those freedoms are interfered with.    
 
                                            
6 “Madison River Communications, LLC Order and Consent Decree,” March  
3, 2005, <http://www.fcc.gov/voip/>. 
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The best proposals for network neutrality rules are simple.  They ban abusive 
behavior like tollboothing and outright blocking and degradation.  And they 
leave open legitimate network services that the Bells and Cable operators 
want to provide, such as offering cable television services and voice services 
along with a neutral internet offering.   They are in line with a tradition of 
protecting consumer’s rights on networks whose instinct is just this:  let 
customers use the network as they please.  No one wants to deny companies 
the right to charge for their services and charge consumers more if they use 
more.   But what does need to be stopped is raw discrimination that is 
nothing more than a tax on innovation taken by government-supported 
corporations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This mission – protecting consumer choice against market power – is a 
minimum and appropriate role of government.  I wouldn’t be here if there 
were five broadband providers, each competing to give customers the best 
and fastest service possible.  If that were the case, I am certain that the best 
service would win out – if one company blocked or slowed some companies, 
consumers would run away. If a rental car company doesn’t let you drive the 
car where you wanted, you’d choose a different company.  The problem is the 
lack of choice in this market.  
 
Let me close by looking at who’s on each side.  The Bell companies have taken 
the lead in moving things back to the world where they pick and choose who 
gets better access on the network.  Who wants that?   Very few people.   Not 
bloggers, libertarian, conservative, or liberal, who know that larger media 
outlets will be favored over them.  Not the application makers, among the 
most active sectors of the nation’s economy.  Not anyone who dislikes or 
distrusts excesses of centralized power.  Not even cable operators.  And, when 
made aware, certainly not consumers.  In fact, no one wants this but the 
Bells themselves, and perhaps that tells us something. 
